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Abstract
Darfur is Sudan’s western region, and the site of one of 
the major crises of the early 21st Century that dominated 
world affairs from 2003 to 2009. The Darfur Crisis 
competed for world attention with major contemporary 
issues such as the US invasion of Iraq, the War on 
Terror, the US presence in Afghanistan, the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, the Kosovo crisis and the civil war in 
Democratic Republic of Congo. China was largely held 
responsible for the overwhelming level of force utilized 
by the Sudanese Government in quelling peaceful 
protests in the region began in spring and summer 
of 2003. Its oil interests in the Sudan were identified 
as the main catalyst for its siding with the Sudanese 
government and shielding it from punitive measures by 
the international community. Other catalysts include 
trade relations and arms sales to Sudan. The objective 
of this article is to examine China’s policy and role 
in the management of the Darfur Crisis over the past 
ten years. It’s based on the thesis that, China’s lenient 
policy toward the Sudanese government, driven by its 
oil interests has encouraged the Sudanese government to 
utilize overwhelming force against Darfur’s legitimate 
protest with impunity.  
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INTRODUCTION
The Darfur Genocide erupted in 2003 when the 
government of General Omar Hasan Al-Bashir in Sudan 
utilized an overwhelming level of violence against 
peaceful protesters in its western region of Darfur 
demanding employment opportunities, education, 
healthcare and housing. Their demands came in 
conjunction with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA, 2003-2005) reached between the government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) in south Sudan ending the civil war in the 
country and providing for the right of self-determination. 
The government of the Sudan’s use of overwhelming 
force against Darfurians was motivated by its reliance on 
Chinese political, economic and military support. China 
shielded the Sudanese government from international 
military intervention, watered down UN’s resolutions 
and sanctions and shielded Sudan’s government from 
world criticism because of its oil interests in the country. 
However, an international campaign initiated by human 
rights organizations called for the boycotting of the 
Summer Olympic Games to be hosted by China in 2008, 
gathered momentum and threatened Beijing’s efforts to 
host the Games. China was aiming to utilize the games 
to move beyond the Tiananmen events and highlight its 
miraculous economic development. 
Darfur represented a major challenge to China’s 
foreign policy, and at the same time provided valuable 
opportunities to exercise influence on a large scale in 
international crises. While Darfur compelled Beijing to 
modify its perspective on the principle of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of other nations, it also made China 
to assume a major international role in UN peacekeeping 
missions and boosted its image as a peacemaker. 
Therefore, Beijing appointed the Darfur’s Special Envoy, 
sent peacekeepers and provided humanitarian assistance 
to Darfur’s refugees. Its main aim was halting world 
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criticism and mobilization against the so called “Genocide 
Olympics”. China also supported the peace process in 
Darfur, though no substantial progress occurred over the 
past decade in terms of refuge-return, peace or stability in 
the region. 
A. Sino-Sudanese Relations: An Overview
The first modern encounter between China and the Sudan 
dates back to the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, 
Indonesia in April 1955. The conference was a major 
venue for Chinese diplomacy. The Chinese Premier, Chou 
En-Lai maximized China engagement with fellow Third 
World countries in hope for diplomatic recognition and 
normalization of ties with China, at a time the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was not a member of the United 
Nations. China’s seat was granted to the Republic of China 
(ROC-Taipei) and the PRC needed a forum to engage in 
international affairs and secure its interests. That forum 
was Bandung and the resulted Non-Aligned Movement, 
and other forums and international conferences associated 
with it. During the Conference, Chou En-Lai met nearly 
with all delegations and tirelessly worked to secure 
cultural, trade, diplomatic and political ties with attendees. 
(Behbehani, 1981) China’s greatest triumphs occurred 
a year later when Egypt, a leading Arab, African and a 
leading Third World country recognized the PRC in 1956, 
followed by Yemen and Syria in the same year, Morocco, 
Algeria and Iraq in 1958, while the Republic of Sudan 
recognized the PRC on February 4, 1959. The Sino-
Arab and Sino-Africa relations were centered on anti-
imperialism, support to the Algerian War of Independence 
(1954-1962), support to the Palestinian cause, anti-
Soviet presence in the Middle East, and China’s support 
to national liberation movements in North Africa, in 
Africa and the Middle East at large. These policies were 
revised in the post-Mao era (1978-present), and China’s 
concentration was primarily confined to economic 
cooperation aimed at accelerating economic reforms in 
China and boosting its growth rates, a policy succeeded 
far beyond the expectations of its original engineers. 
However, China’s relations with the Arab countries, with 
the Middle East and Africa grew in a multifaceted manner 
since then to include energy security, trade relations, arms 
sales, culture and political coordination. 
For the period from 1955-1972, the Sino-Sudanese 
relations were dealt with in the shadow of the Chinese-
Egyptian relations. China, however, was satisfied with 
its bilateral relations with the Sudan, and accelerated the 
pace of their bilateral cooperation since the 1970s. The 
core of their bilateral relations was supporting Sudan’s 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, anti-
imperialism, suppressing pro-Soviet forces in the Sudan, 
arms sales, economic assistance, and then cooperation in 
the energy sector since 1995, which promoted Chinese 
involvement in Sudan’s politics as never before. China’s 
role in the Darfur Crisis is part of its overall deep 
involvement in the Sudanese affairs. In fact, the military 
coup occurred in the Sudan in 1989, led by the Islamists 
in alliance with the military was not well-received on the 
international scene. The regime was accused of association 
with international terrorism and accused of harboring 
major terrorist figures such as Osama Ben Laden and 
providing material support to terrorist organizations. 
Therefore, its friends were limited. 
In 1995, General Al-Bashir, the military ruler of Sudan 
visited China, and signed arms sales deals, and offered 
major concessions in the area of oil exploration to China. 
The latter accepted the invitation and managed to discover 
and produce from Sudan’s oil fields in three years. By 
the end of the decade, the Sudan became an oil producing 
and exporting country and by 2007, it became the third 
largest oil exporting country in Africa with production 
capacity of 460,000 bpd, 60% of it was exported to China. 
Henceforth, when the Darfur Crisis erupted in 2003, 
China has had well-established interests in the Sudan, and 
sought to protect them by all means. For its defense of the 
Sudanese government and its fierce defense of its interests 
in Sudan amidst the Darfur Crisis, China earned the world 
resentment. It was held responsible for the perpetuation 
of the suffering of the people of Darfur, prolonging the 
crisis, and providing the regime in Khartoum with a 
life line, and shielding it from being held responsible 
for the atrocities in Darfur, and elsewhere in the Sudan. 
Currently, China is playing the same role in the Syrian 
crisis in close coordination with Russia, its close ally 
and managing it with the same team managed its policy 
toward Darfur. China and Russia invented the “double 
veto” mechanism to block any serious action against the 
Syrian regime, carrying out crimes-against humanity, 
ethnic cleanings genocide-like attacks on its people. It 
has been the standard that genocide is usually carried out 
by the majority against the minority. In the Syrian case, 
it’s the minority (Alawires, 2% of the population), aided 
by foreign powers (Iran, China, Russia, Venezuela) is 
carrying out the genocide against the majority, 98% of 
Syria’s population are Sunni Muslims.
B. China and the Darfur Crisis 
In reference to the systematic violence in Darfur where 
over 200,000 innocent civilians were exterminated, 
China preferred to call it a “humanitarian crisis” rather 
than using the term “genocide.” Chinese media referred 
to it as the “alleged” Darfur Genocide (Xinhua Press 
Agency, 2012, June 8). Xinhua Press Agency, the main 
source of news for Chinese media described it as, “the 
ensuing conflict has been allegedly called the Darfur 
Genocide.”1 At other times, it used terms such as “issue, 
crisis, case, dilemma, impasse, problem, question, etc..” 
Astoundingly, the United Nations agreed with China’s 
1h t tp : / /news .x inhuane t .com/engl i sh /wor ld /2012-06/08/
c_131639847.htm
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conceptualization of the conflict, while the US was the 
first country to call it genocide, defined as systematic 
violence used to annihilate a certain group or ethnicity. In 
fact, the UN’s International Commission for the Inquiry 
on Darfur established by United Nations Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 
of 18 September 2004, concluded after three months of 
examining the conflict: 
that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of 
genocide, though genocide might be deduced from acts carried 
out by both sides -the government and the militia- consisting of 
killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical 
destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard, 
the existence of a protected group being targeted by the authors 
of criminal conduct. However, the crucial element of genocidal 
intent appears to be missing.2 
Darfur represented a major predicament for China as it 
found itself in the midst of an international crisis and was 
compelled to act. Darfur was unlike previous crises that 
China encountered in its international relations. While 
the US and the European Union (EU) were blamed for the 
inaction in the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, China 
was solely blamed for the genocide in Darfur due to its 
partnership with the Sudanese regime, fairly or unfairly. 
China’s claims of strict commitment and adherence to 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence -highlighting 
among them a firm commitment to sovereignty and non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other nations- did 
not exempt it from its responsibilities toward Darfur. 
Additionally, its repeated claims, emphasizing that such 
principles guided its foreign policy since the 1950s, only 
escalated the anti-Chinese campaign. Mawdsley put it, 
“China maintains that business is business, and that it 
has no right or wishes to interfere in the sovereignty of 
other nations. However, while this may be true in terms 
of imposing governance and trade conditionalities, China 
is without a doubt a political player in Africa,” (Mawdsley, 
2007) and as such, it was incumbent upon China to play 
the role of responsible stakeholder in international affairs. 
Truth be told, the Five Principles were violated in different 
degrees during the Mao era, but they have become more 
relevant to post-Mao era where China pursued a business-
like foreign policy focusing on mutual benefits and 
trade, in particular. Chinese leaders coined the “win-win” 
terminology in describing bilateral and multilateral trade 
relations with fellow developing countries.
While China resisted playing a proactive role in 
the crisis, the 2008-Beijing Summer Olympic Games 
provided no alternative. Taylor explains that “a full-
scale foreign policy that played up China’s contribution 
2 The United Nations. (2005, January 25). Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary 
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 
September 2004, Geneva: Switzerland (P.4). Retrieved from http://
www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf
to conflict resolution and encouraged much more 
proactive explanations of Sino-African diplomacy came 
into effect” (Taylor, 2009). Global criticism over Darfur 
accelerated China’s reevaluation of its foreign policy 
toward the United Nations and international law in 
preserving international peace, vis-à-vis its commitment 
to the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations ( 
Holslag, 2008). Since the Darfur Crisis, China has become 
an active participant in UN peacekeeping missions in 
Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. In fact, it has 
1600 peacekeepers, and “three-fourths of current Chinese 
peacekeeping forces are supporting U.N. missions in 
Africa.”(Bates, Huang, & Morrison, 2007). Aside from 
France, Chinese peacekeepers are more in number than 
any other permanent member of the Security Council.  
C. The Crisis and China’s Response
The Darfur crisis erupted when the international community 
and the Sudanese government were engaged in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North 
and South Sudan in Abuja, Nigeria, between 2003 and 
2005. The US played a significant role in the negotiations 
in the summer of 2003, and President Bush wanted to 
host John Garang and Omar Al Bashir at the White House 
to sign the document. This move, along with ending the 
Libyan program of WMD and the rehabilitation of the 
Gaddafi regime, would highlight American diplomatic 
success in North Africa and the Middle East and play 
down the US catastrophic invasion of Iraq. These plans 
were disrupted by reports on the Darfur violence.   
A former adviser to the Sudanese Presidential Court 
shared with me that when the delegations were meeting 
in Abuja, General Al-Bashir received a phone call from 
Khartoum informing him of an “insurgency-like” protest 
carried out by some indigenous Darfurians. His reply 
was “crush the rebellion.” While peace negotiations 
were successfully being carried out in Abuja, the Sudan’s 
Armed Forces went on a rampage of violence and 
destruction aided by the Janjaweed militia. The resulting 
level of violence is characterized by the United States as 
genocide, while the United Nations termed it a “crisis.” 
The EU and the African Union (AU) described the 
violence as “crimes against humanity”, but not genocide, 
though over 200,000 Darfurians were murdered, and 1.7 
million people were displaced.  
The international community was surprised by the 
unfolding events in Darfur; the Sudanese Government 
was in a successful process of reconciliation with the 
South, but imprudently opened up a new front in the 
West while another rebellion was simmering in Eastern 
Sudan. In essence, the government wanted to annihilate 
the rebellion in Darfur before the international community 
became aware of the atrocities committed by its armed 
forces.  Sudan’s government and military generals 
reasoned that, even if the international community became 
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aware of the violence in Darfur, they would hardly 
be concerned. Their rationale was that Darfurians are 
Muslim and that the US and Western countries, as well 
as human rights organizations,  couldn’t care less about 
violence committed against Muslims around the world, 
seeing the attention the West gave to Southern Sudan and 
East Timor, predominantly Christian territories. But the 
world did notice, did care, and the first reports brought to 
the attention of the UN Security Council were made by 
the UN representative in the Sudan. The world showed 
as much concern about the Muslims of Darfur as the 
Christians in the South; it rallied behind the people of 
Darfur, trying to avoid a reprehensible repeat of Rwanda a 
decade earlier.
Given its leverage with the government in Khartoum, 
China was criticized for not doing enough to pressure its 
ally to halt the violence. The international community was 
also divided over the Darfur Crisis; the US was entangled 
in its War on Terror worldwide and the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, while Russia was embroiled with its conflict 
with Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the 
EU’s involvement in Kosovo and the series of crises 
related to former Yugoslavia. Between 2003 and 2007, 
the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and the Arab 
League were heavily involved in dealing with the crisis. 
Several resolutions were introduced, most of which were 
watered down by China and Russia to soften the impact 
on the Sudanese government. During the first phase of the 
conflict (2003-2007), China insisted on its commitment to 
non-intervention, militarily or otherwise, and maintained 
that economic sanctions should not be imposed on the 
Sudan, and that UN-AU peacekeeping forces should 
not be deployed without the consent of the Sudanese 
Government. Such opposition widened differences 
between members Security Council, China and Russia 
on one side, and the rest of the international community 
on the other side. While the crisis has brought China 
and Russia closer as in the current case of Syria, it has 
widened the gap between the US and China in particular. 
In fact, “this contention reflects long-running Sino-
American differences over the use of economic sanctions 
as a diplomatic instrument.”(Zha, 2006) The violence 
in Darfur continued for four years before the United 
Nations and the African Union convinced the Sudan of the 
legitimacy of deploying peacekeeping forces. 
China attempted to ignore the conflict for the first three 
years, but it was evident that hiding behind the principle 
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations 
and relevant UN principles, alone were insufficient to 
deal with mounting international pressure directed at 
China’s inaction, its engagement with the Sudan, and its 
obstructionist tactics at the United Nations. A coalition 
of 150 human rights organizations worldwide launched 
the Save Darfur Campaign, and the UN, the US, the EU, 
and the African Union mounted a massive crusade against 
China charging it with immorality, self-centeredness and 
shepherd of genocide in Darfur. In the early months of 
2007, the campaign intensified calling on the international 
community to boycott the Olympic Games in Beijing 
in 2008, stigmatizing them as “Genocide Olympics.” 
Horr i f ied by the  momentum the  campaign was 
gathering, China initiated a counter-campaign to clarify 
its perspective on the Darfur conflict, highlighting its 
contributions, its role in resolving the conflict, the pressure 
it was exercising on the Sudanese government, and the 
humanitarian assistance it provided to the country. Above 
all, China highlighted what it called the “unfairness” of 
linking the Olympic Games to politics, surprisingly, a 
view shared by President Bush and Gordon Brown, the 
British Prime Minister and many other Western and non-
Western leaders. The support and the goodwill China 
received towards a successful Olympics season, especially 
from African and Arab countries, did not deter the global 
movement of Save Darfur from exerting sustained 
pressure on China, eventually forcing Beijing to shift its 
policy from non-intervention to exercising direct pressure 
on General Al-Bashir. In essence, in a record six months 
China altered its foreign policy from the extreme position 
of non-intervention to active participation in UN-AU 
mission in Darfur. It issued ultimatums and sometimes 
threats to convince General Al-Bashir to allow UN-AU 
peacekeepers into Darfur. Since then, China has become a 
major contributing country to UN peacekeeping missions 
around the world, and in Africa in particular. In fact, it 
was the first non-African country to deploy engineers and 
logistical military personnel to set up the infrastructure 
necessary for UN-AU forces in Darfur. Accordingly, 
China became the go-to for solutions to the crisis.  
Zhai Jun, Assistant Foreign Affairs Minister, former 
ambassador to Egypt, and Envoy to Africa, were 
China’s liaison in charge of the Darfur Crisis. His 
mission, as he understood it, was “to accomplish peace, 
stability and development of the Darfur region through 
negotiations”(Xinhua Press Agency, 2007, April 11). In 
2007, four years into the conflict, Jun reiterated China’s 
opposition to imposing sanctions on the Sudan. He 
stated that “it is not necessary to resort to sanctions or 
other pressures” (Xinhua Press Agency, 2007, April 11), 
and highlighted several accomplishments of his office, 
among which was persuading the Sudan to accept the 
peace plan drafted by the United Nations, and providing 
humanitarian assistance estimated at $10.4 million in 
2007. Simultaneously, Jun expressed his empathy with 
Sudan’s concerns “about its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity” (Xinhua Press Agency, 2007, April 11).
On May 10, 2007, China appointed Ambassador Liu 
Guijin as Special Envoy to Darfur. He was a longtime 
veteran of African affairs and former ambassador to South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. Guijin traveled between the Sudan 
and the United Nation’s Headquarters, Washington DC, 
London, Addis Ababa, Cairo and several other capitals to 
build an international consensus on Darfur. He continued 
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to highlight China’s belief that pressure and sanctions 
would not be helpful for the resolution of the Darfur issue. 
He stated that solving Darfur’s issue required a “holistic 
approach” and the efforts of five parties: Sudanese efforts, 
the efforts of the resistance movement and of neighboring 
countries, the African Union, the international community 
and the United Nations. Commenting on the role of 
the resistance movement in Darfur, Guijin stressed that 
“without the progress of the political process and the 
consensus between the Sudanese government and the 
resistance movement, it is very difficult to make progress 
in the deployment of the hybrid operation, to end the 
turmoil and improve the security in Darfur” (Xinhua 
Press Agency, 2008, February 22).In defending China’s 
policy goals toward Darfur, Guijin maintained that 
China’s position was no different from the US or other 
Western powers. On China’s arms sales to the Sudan, he 
continued, China had no control over the destination or 
the use of its weapons. He pointed out that China was one, 
among several countries that sold weapons to Sudan, like 
Iran, Russia, and Belarus. He also stressed that, the US 
was the biggest arms supplier and some of its weapons 
used in Iraq landed in the hands of insurgents. He also 
downplayed the delay in deployment of the joint UN-
AU peace force in Darfur due to “technical difficulties,” 
and most of them were resolved with China’s technical 
expertise (Yardley, 2008, March 8). Guijin highlighted 
what he called the “distinguished” Chinese approach 
to international affairs, clearly in contrast with that of 
the West, stating that “you can describe China’s role in 
resolving the Darfur issue as unique, since we speak 
and act in a manner our African friends understand 
and accept” (Xinhua Press Agency, 2007, October 2). 
Although Guijin remained apologetic and defensive at 
times, he was successful in convincing the government of 
the Sudan to accept the UN-AU peacekeeping force. He 
was aided by the direct involvement of Chinese President 
Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi. During his visit to the Sudan in February 2007, 
Hu Jintao delivered a direct, clear and concise message 
to Al-Bashir: deal with the Darfur “problem.” The visit 
came as part of an Africa tour during which he also visited 
Cameroon, Liberia, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, 
Mozambique and Seychelles. In addition to bilateral and 
multilateral relations between China and Africa, the trip 
involved highlighting Beijing’s seriousness in dealing 
with the crisis in Darfur, highlighting that the highest level 
of the Chinese leadership was involved in resolving the 
conflict (Xinhua Press Agency, 2010, May 26).
From 2009 to 2011, the Darfur Crisis was placed on 
the back burner of international relations, although Qatar 
in particular kept it alive through its Good Offices and 
sheepherding of the peace process. It was not completely 
successful, although violence in Darfur was significantly 
reduced. Several major factors contributed to Darfur 
taking a backseat. First, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 
and the ensuing civil war kept the United States fully 
occupied from 2002 to the end of 2010. The invasion 
consumed seven years of Bush’s eight-year term, and the 
first two years of Obama’s. The US was also preoccupied 
with the War on Terror and its heavy presence in 
Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, North and Western 
Africa, and Yemen. The second major factor was the 
outbreak of Arab Spring toward the end of 2010, and the 
conflicts and wars associated with it that continues today. 
The Sudanese protest movement failed to challenge and 
change General Al-Bashir’s regime, unlike the movements 
in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The third factor is the 
violence occurring in Syria. China did not learn its lesson 
from Darfur, but is playing an identical role characterized 
by obstructionism, delayed tactics and manipulation at 
the United Nations. Iran’s nuclear program is yet another 
factor that overshadows the Darfur Crisis, just like the 
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza.  
In January of 2011, South Sudan organized a 
referendum for self-determination according to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005. The 
result was overwhelming support for independence: 98% 
of voters supported the separation, which occurred in July, 
same year. This caused a major shift and drove millions 
of citizens from the north to the south and vice versa, 
not to mention that this territorial migration and border 
skirmishes again overshadowed the Darfur conflict. 
The situation in Darfur remains static: several national 
liberation movements operating in the region have been 
unable to reach a consensus on the peace process or 
pursue an all-out war against the Sudanese government.
D. The Current Situation in Darfur    
Over the past four years, one of the main developments 
is the clear goal of toppling the Al-Bashir regime by 
the Darfur Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
in coordination with the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-North (SPLM-North) which operates south of 
the Kurdufan region. SPLM-North and JEM established 
the Sudanese Liberation Front (SRF) which carries 
out major attacks on government forces. Several times 
it inched closer to Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, 
which only perpetuates the conflict in the foreseeable 
future. As stated above, Qatar continues to host peace 
talks and organizes development and reconstruction 
conferences in Doha. The generous pledges made at the 
International Donor Conference for the Reconstruction 
and Development in Darfur, held in Doha the 7-8 April, 
2013 reached its goal of $7.0 billion, though the debate 
continues among donors on the best manner of dispensing 
the funds: toward reconstruction or peacekeeping 
(Aljazeera. (2013, April 8). 
Ibrahim Gambari, head of the UN-AU peacekeeping 
force, stated that “the level of violence in Darfur arising 
from direct confrontation between the government and the 
armed movements has decreased significantly, compared 
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to 2010; some will even say up to 70 percent. Similarly, 
the number of fatalities arising from the conflict over 
resources between the nomads and the farmers has gone 
down almost the same, about 70 percent” (The United 
Nations News Center, 2011, July 22). However, by no 
means has the conflict completely ended. Hundreds of 
thousands of refugees are still scattered between Chad, 
Central African Republic (CAR) and other neighboring 
countries, and the government of the Sudan has not taken 
the necessary steps to repatriate them or establish the 
necessary conditions for their return.  
E. Sino-Sudanese Relations and the Darfur Crisis
China’s ties with the Sudan are multifaceted, but oil, trade 
and arms sales tangled China into the violence in Darfur.  
1.  OIL AND ITS IMPACT ON DARFUR 
The bulk of the blame China shoulders over the Darfur 
Crisis has to deal with its oil investments in the Sudan. 
Between 1996 and 2001, China invested $8 billion in 
Sudan’s oil sector. This explains the fact that, “China 
initially refused to take a strong stand against the behavior 
of the Sudanese government in the matter of Darfur, 
raised strong protest in the Western countries against 
Chinese investment policies” (Kemp, 2010). As Kemp put 
it, “China’s reliance on its economic clout and its hands-
off approach in international matters of other countries 
has served its interest, and made China avoid major 
confrontations with the United States, doubts remains 
about the sustainability of that approach in areas such as 
the Grater Middle east and Africa, which are so ridden 
with unresolved and emotional conflict.”3 Chinese oil 
investments in the Sudan were used as a mobilizing force. 
In fact, human rights organizations and China’s rivals 
produced slogans such as ‘China’s Safari,’ and ‘Oil for 
Blood’ to pressure Beijing in taking drastic positions on 
the crisis.
Sino-Sudanese oil cooperation predates the Darfur 
Crisis. It also represents a trend in China’s energy policy, 
a quest for “entering the Western-dominated oil market 
by finding unexploited opportunities.”4 In 1995, since 
American and Canadian oil companies left, the Sudan 
invited Chinese oil corporations to explore its territory. 
Subsequently, China National Petroleum Company 
(CNPC) began oil exploration attracting Indian and 
Malaysian companies, as well. CNPC managed to produce 
oil in a record time, and the Sudan became oil producing 
country by 1999, and a major oil exporting country 
by 2001, and the third largest sub-Saharan African-oil 
exporting country by 2009, after Nigeria (2.2 mbpd), 
3 Kemp, Ibid, p.67.
4 Sudan Issue Brief, Arms, Oil and Darfur: the Evolution of 
Relations between China and Sudan. (2007, July 7, p.2). Retrieved 
from http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-7-
Arms.pdf
and Angola (1.4 mbpd). It is estimated that Sudan’s 
daily production stood at 465,000 bpd, and its proven 
oil reserves by the end of 2010 at 6.7 billion barrels of 
crude oil.5 The bulk of it was exported to China at a rate 
of 60% of total Sudanese oil production. However, with 
the division of Sudan into two countries in 2011, 75% 
of Sudan’s oil facilities are currently under the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS). 
Strategic adjustments to establish China’s role in both 
north and south have become a turbulent process. China 
made Sudan an oil producing and exporting country, and 
most likely it will also sustain the oil facilities in the RSS, 
expand its oil exploration, and set up its infrastructure. 
The table below illustrates Sudan’s oil production from 
2001 to 2014.
Table 1
Sudan’s Oil Production in Thousands of Barrels, 2001-
2014
Year Production Year Production 
1993 2 2004 301
1994 2 2005 305
1995 2 2006 331
1996 5 2007 468
1997 9 2008 480
1998 12 2009 475
1999 63 2010 465
2000 179 2011 291
2001 217 2012 103
2002 241 2013 122
2003 265 2014 120*
Note .  Sources: For the years 2001 and 2002, Source: British 
Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012 at bp.com/
statisticalreview. For the years 2003-2013: British Petroleum Review of 
World Energy, June 2014. Retrieved from http://www.bp.com/content/
dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2014/BP-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2014-full-report.pdf. For 2014, Sudan Tribune 
at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot37
China’s involvement in the oil sector is not confined 
to the Sudan or the Republic of South Sudan, contrary; it 
spreads to the entire continent and represents the bulk of 
China’s imports from Africa. Yu states that “oil made up 
the bulk of African exports to China, comprising some 
80 percent of total exports, followed by logs, diamonds, 
cotton and iron. The largest African exporter to China 
was Angola (37 percent), followed by South Africa 
(14 percent), Congo (10 percent), Equatorial Guinea (9 
percent), and the Sudan (7 percent).”(Lowell & Yu, 2010) 
Sutter finds that “as the Darfur crisis worsened in 2004, 
China used its position on the UN security Council to 
weaken resolutions on the crisis and to avoid the threat 
of sanctions against the Sudanese government that would 
have affected Chinese investments in the country.”(Sutter, 
2010) Clearly, China’s dominance in the Sudanese oil 
5 British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy. (2012, 
June). Retrieved from bp.com/statisticalreview
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sector was the primary catalyst for its fierce defense of 
the government of Sudan, in spite of threats of military 
intervention, sanctions and regime change over Darfur.  
2.  TRADE RELATIONS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON DARFUR
The remarkable success China had in the oil sector spilled 
over to other bilateral relations with the Sudan, especially 
in the trade, becoming Sudan’s major trading partner. It’ 
estimated that 68.3% of Sudan’s total external exports 
head to China, estimated at $7.705 billion, followed by 
Japan with 12.6%, and India with 5.8%. 21.7% of Sudan’s 
total imports are from China, valued at $8.839 billion in 
2011, followed by Egypt 8%, Saudi Arabia 7.7%, India 
6.1% and the UAE 5.7%. While the Sudan exports oil, 
cotton, sesame oil, livestock, seeds, and sugar, it imports 
foodstuff, manufactured goods, medicine, chemicals, 
refinery equipment, textiles, wheat, machinery, etc..6 The
table below illustrates Sino-Sudanese trade volume 
for  the  per iod  f rom 2001-2012,  in  $  mi l l ions .
Table 2
Volume of Trade Between Sudan and China in 
$millions From 2001 to 2013
Year Volume of trade in               $ millions Year 
Volume of trade in      
$ millions
2013 4,500.00 2006 3,353.81
2012 3,732.89 2005 3,908.05
2011 11,536.15 2004 2,521.76
2010 8,626.7 2003 1,920.24
2009 6,338, 82 2002 1,549.98
2008 8,200.22 2001 109.37
2007 5,708.03
Note. Sources: for the period from 2001-2010: China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2010, China Statistics Press, Beijing: PRC, p.238, also 
retrieved from www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexee.htm. For the 
years of 2011 and 2012: China Statistical Yearbook, 2013, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing: PRC, p.233.  For the year of 2013: Sudan 
Vision at: http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=234422
8Observatory of Economic Complexity, Sudan Country Profile. 
(2013). Retrieved from http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/
sdn/
9 China Statistical Yearbook. (2013, p.233). China Statistics Press, 
Beijing: PRC.
6 World Facts Book, Country Profile, the Sudan, Central Intelligence 
Agency: United States of America. Retrieved from https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html
7 China Statistical Yearbook. (2013, p.232). China Statistics Press, 
Beijing: PRC.
 
Table 3
Sudan’s Top 20 Import Destinations in 2013, in $ Millions 
Rank Country Value/$ millions Percent % Rank Country Value/$ millions Percent %
1 China 1,977,596,848.82 21 11 Italy 238,874,570.35 2.6
2 India 777,763,735.18 8.3 12 Malaysia 208,506,932.54 2.2
3 Egypt 518,404,105.77 6.2 13 S. Korea 187,519,668.53 2.0
4 S. Arabia 518,404,105.77 5.6 14 Bangladesh 177,172,366.51 1.9
5 Uganda 390,057,838.56 4.2 15 Ethiopia 162,334,774.09 1.7
6 UAE 349,319,242.34 3.7 16 Japan 155,481,591.02 1.7
7 Turkey 286,929,261.53 3.1 17 Russia 151,187,281.47 1.6
8 Australia 277,727,623.68 3.0 18 Netherlands 123,588,604.68 1.3
9 Germany 253,620,172.47 2.7 19 Brazil 120,685,285.00 1.3
10 UK 252,089,331.07 2.7 20 Canada 116,320,635.92 1.2
Note. Source: This table is compiled from data provided by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Sudan Country Profile. (2013). Retrieved from 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/sdn/
In 2010, China’s five top trading partners in Africa 
were Sudan, Angola, South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt. 
Most of its African imports were related to oil. In fact, 
Sino-African trade volume reached $126.9 billion in 
2010, increased to $166,632.289 billion in 2011 and 
jumped to $198,561.25 billion in 2012, heading steadily 
toward the $ 400.00 billion aim by 20107. As Sautman, 
Barry and Yan (2007) assert, “Africa is the most resource-
laden continent, with every primary product required 
for industry.”(Sautman & Yan, 2007) It’s essential to 
state here that, although Sudan’s oil fortune transferred 
to South Sudan, the Sudan remains a rich country with 
minerals and agriculture, two important sectors to China’s 
manufacturing industry. The current Sino-Sudanese trade 
relations expanded to minerals, agriculture, free zones, 
etc. therefore, on the long run, the Sudan is expected 
to recover from its losses of major oilfields to the RSS. 
Currently, gold accounts for 49.09%, followed by crude 
oil at 37%. While the UAE is China top exporting 
destination (35%) , China is Sudan’s second exporting 
destination (28%),8 however, China is Sudan’s top import 
destination. The table below illustrates Sudan’s top 20 
import destination, at the end of 2013.
Finally, both China and the Sudan used existing trade 
forums and established new entities to boost and promote 
their bilateral trade estimated at the end of 2010 at 
$8626.7 billion; it reached its peak in 2011 at $11,536.15 
billion, and dropped to $3,732.89 after the separation of 
the south.9 Sudan and China conduct their trade relations 
through several bilateral and multilateral frameworks, 
organizations, entities, and institutions. The Chinese 
general umbrella for cooperation with Africa is the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was 
established in 2000. Other venues are The China-Sudan 
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3. ARMS SALES AND DARFUR CRISIS 
A third dimension to Sino-Sudanese relations that has 
antagonized the international community has to deal with 
China’s arms sales to the regime of General Al-Bashir. 
Human rights organizations, world media, the United 
Nations, the United States, the EU and the African Union 
documented the presence and use of Chinese weapons in 
Darfur, such as jet fighters, tanks, bombs, ammunition, and 
light arms. The Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), an authority on armament announced 
that, China has become the fifth largest arms supplier 
in March 2013, overtaking the UK.10 While SIPRI has 
repeatedly complained of lack of transparency on the side 
of China in reference to its arms sales, the table below 
indicates China’s value of arms exports to a selected 
number of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.  
Table 4
China’s Arms Sales in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in $ 
Millions
Country 2011 2012 2013 Total in $ millions  
Bangladesh 160 219 552 931
Bolivia 21 NA NA 21
Cambodia NA 15 42 57
Egypt NA 1 1 2
Ethiopia NA 9 46 55
Ghana 56 9 NA 65
Indonesia 13 66 66 145
Iran 62 44 NA 107
Laos NA 15 15 30
Morocco 34 34 68
Myanmar 323 372 213 907
Namibia NA 52 NA 52
Pakistan 578 592 760 1,930
Seychelles 5 NA NA 5
Sierra Leone 2 NA NA 2
Sudan 2 2 1 5
Tanzania 73 151 25 249
Thailand 5 25 25 54
Venezuela 8 46 92 146
Zambia NA 53 NA 53
Total 1342 1704 1837 4883
Note. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2014, 
July 28). Trend Indicators Value (TIVs) expressed in $million. Retrieved 
from http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background
China contributed to the Sudanese arms buildup in at 
least four ways, reinforcing the Sudanese Government’s 
ability to wage a war in Darfur.  
Mixed Committee on Trade and Economy, the China-
Africa Development Fund, the Sino-Arab Cooperation 
Forum, and the China-Arab States Financial Cooperation 
Forum. However, FOCAC remains the most important 
Sino-African forum. Sudan is also a member of the China-
Arab Trade Forum and the China-Arab States Financial 
Cooperation Forum. 
First, oil revenues generated tremendous financial 
resources used by the government to enhance its security, 
purchase weapons and generously spend on its armed 
forces. Facing strong competition in the arms markets, 
China was more than willing to sell the Sudanese 
government weapons in exchange for hard currency, 
trade, minerals and oil concessions. Other countries 
such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, North Korea and 
Iran transferred arms to the Sudanese government, as 
well. SIPRI reports that Sudanese military expenditures 
increased drastically since 1997. It was estimated that 
Sudan spent $15.4 million on armament in 1997, $882 
million in 2001, $1,021.00 billion in 2002, $900 million 
in 2003, jumped to $2,561.00 billion in 2004 and reached 
$2,292.00 billion in 2006, the peak of the Darfur crisis.11  
SIPRI reports no figures for Sudan’s arms expenditures 
from 2007 to 2014. The table below illustrates Sudan’s 
arms imports from China in $millions for the period from 
1987-2013.
Table 5
Sudan’s Arms Imports From China From 1987-2013 
in $ Millions 
Years Value in $ millions Years Value in $ millions
1987-1990 115 2002-2005 133
1991-1994 52 2005-2008 46
1995-1998 54 2009-2011 NA
1999-2001 NA 2011-2013 10
Note. Sources: For the period from 1987-2011, Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, July 28, 2014. Trend Indicators Value (TIVs) 
expressed in $million. Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/databases/
armstransfers/background
For the period from 2011-2013: The Stockholm 
Intentional Peace Research Institute, 2013 Yearbook, 
Oxford University Press: London. (p.181, 182).
Second, China supplied arms to the Sudan, defying a 
UN embargo on weapons to Darfur. On March 13, 2008 
Human Rights First (HRF) published a report entitled 
“Made in China, Stop Arms Sales to Sudan” stating that: 
China supplied 89.95% of Sudan’s small arms in 2004; 94.16% 
in 2005; and 87.66% in 2006. Sudan’s purchases of small arms, 
small arms parts, and ammunition have risen dramatically since 
1999. By 2005, Sudan’s small arms imports had risen to more 
than 680 times their 1999 levels. From 2003 to 2006, the period 
covering the worst abuses by Sudanese government forces in 
Darfur, China sold over $55 million worth of small arms to 
Khartoum. Since 2004, the year in which the United Nations 
Security Council imposed an embargo on arms transfers to 
Darfur, China has been the near-exclusive provider of small arms 
to Khartoum, supplying approximately 90 percent of Sudan’s 
small arms purchases each year. Observers on the ground in 
Darfur have reported seeing Chinese weaponry, including 
grenade launchers and ammunition for assault rifles and heavy 
machine guns. (Human Rights First, 2011, August 3) 
In addition to light and medium arms, China sold 
aircraft, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles. HRF 
 10Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2013, p.241). 
Yearbook. Oxford University Press: London.
11Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2011). 
Yearbook. (p.187). Oxford University Press: London,
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reports that China sold Sudan 20 A-5C Fanton fighter-
bombers, six K-8 advanced trainer aircraft and 12 
Chinese FC1 Fighter aircraft, between 2003 and 2007, the 
worst years of the conflict. The A-5C Fanton jet fighter is 
capable of delivering 4,000 pounds of bombs in a single 
strike (Human Rights First, 2011, August 3). Ian Taylor 
adds that by 2006 the Sudanese air force was “equipped 
with $100 million worth of Shenyang fighter planes, 
including a dozen supersonic F-7 jets.” (Taylor, 2006) 
Amnesty International (AI) reports that:
China and Russia are selling arms to the Government of Sudan 
in the full knowledge that many of them are likely to end up 
being used to commit human rights violations in Darfur… the 
Darfur conflict is sustained by the constant flow of weapons 
from abroad. To help prevent further serious violations of 
human rights, all international arms transfers to Sudan should be 
immediately suspended and the UN arms embargo extended to 
the whole country. (Amnesty International, 2012, February 8) 
AI and several other organizations called for an 
effective Arms Trade Treaty (Amnesty International, 2012, 
February 8). In 2010, China’s mission to the United Nations 
attempted to suppress a UN report drafted by a panel of 
arms exports that showed evidence of China’s continued 
arms sales to the Sudan, seven years into the Darfur 
conflict (The Guardian, 2010, October, Thursday). In 
fact, while the Sudanese government continued to receive 
Chinese, Russian, Iranian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian 
weapons, the supply of weapons to Darfur’s resistance 
movements was severely restricted.  
Third, China helped the Sudan to develop arms 
manufacturing capabilities since 1995, much like it helped 
to build an Iranian arms manufacturing base. Observers 
report that Chinese engineers are supervising the 
production of arms at several Sudanese factories, among 
which are the Giad industrial Complex in Khartoum, and 
Kalakla, Chojeri and Bageer outside the capital.  
Fourth, since 1999 China provided training for and 
supervised the modernization of the Sudanese Armed 
Forces. This aspect of Sino-Sudanese cooperation is 
critical as senior Chinese military officials have been 
exchanging visits and coordinating closely with Sudan 
leading a partnership between China’s People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), and Sudanese Armed Forces, especially 
with Sudan’s Air Force (SAF) since 2002. (Patey, 2011) 
PLA trained Sudanese pilots to fly A-5C, K-8, Russian, 
Ukrainian and Belarusian MIGs and Sukhoi jet fighters, 
and other types of military equipment.  
Chinese arms shipments to the Sudan were not 
influenced by UN resolutions that imposed the arms 
embargo on Darfur since 2004. In fact, in late 2010, a UN 
panel of arms experts compiled a report on arms sales 
to the Sudan that eventually found their way to Darfur, 
confirming the presence of Chinese arms in the territory, 
as well as arms made in Russia and Belarus. 
For instance, Russia has sold some 36 Mi-24 and Mi-17 
helicopters to Khartoum since 2009, while Belarus has sold 
15 Sukhoi 25 jets to the Sudanese government since 2008, 
according to the panel. Sudan signed end-user agreements with 
both governments guaranteeing that the aircrafts would not be 
used in Darfur. (Colum, 2010, October 16, Saturday) 
The Sudanese government continues to receive 
military assistance and to purchase arms from several 
sources; China is one of them.  
4.  ENDING THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR 
AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 
The entanglement of international interests in the Sudan 
has made resolving the conflict nearly impossible. 
However, the diminishing importance of Sudan to 
China’s energy security in favor of South Sudan 
might be a catalyst leading to resolution to the Darfur 
Crisis.  The United Nations and African Union have 
also reduced the size of their joint mission from 7000 
to 2000 in Darfur, in favor of supporting missions in 
South Sudan. Additionally, it’s estimated that 75% 
to 80% of Sudan’s oil fields are currently under the 
jurisdiction of the Republic of South Sudan, and if it 
proceeds with its current plans of an alternative pipeline 
through Ethiopia to Djibouti’s ports, Sudan’s strategic 
importance to China will be reduced significantly. China 
has increasingly been viewing Al-Bashir’s regime as a 
liability more than an asset; therefore, it would be more 
than willing to compromise on its survival in a similar 
manner to the Gaddafi regime in Libya. The situation 
in Darfur and the prolonging of the crisis threatens the 
stability of the entire region, not only the fragile peace 
in the Sudan.  
There are several frameworks are being considered for 
resolving/managing the conflict in Darfur:
4.1  Self-Determination and the Republic of 
Darfur
Although African and Arab countries are not in need of 
any more fragmentation, if unity is inconceivable, then 
cessation might be considered. A Republic of Darfur 
is an option and an alternative to the current situation. 
Historically, Darfur had been an independent, affluent, 
and prosperous Sultanate (monarchy), and its very 
independent spirit collided with British colonialism in 
1916 when it supported the Ottoman Empire in World War 
I. This collision annexed Darfur by force to the British 
domain. A counterview is that an independent Darfur 
would only lead to the creation of another corrupted 
and failed African state such as South Sudan, Somalia, 
Chad, Libya, and Eritrea. While this reasoning might be 
accurate, but the continuing violence and the displacement 
of Darfurians is unsustainable. The alternative is the right 
of self-determination. The cessation of Darfur has support 
among some Western countries and Western grassroots 
organizations that significantly helped the split of East 
Timor in 1996, and South Sudan in 2011.  
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4.2  The Darfur Autonomous Region
Using Chinese administrative terminology, the Sudan 
might consider granting Darfur an autonomous status, thus 
uniting the region as it was historically, one entity. The 
current division of Darfur into three or five administrative 
regions is a security solution that seeks to fragment the 
unity of Darfur and facilitate the central government’s 
control over the territory. China and Russia and elsewhere 
provides an insight on how autonomous governments 
function, and the role they play in establishing social 
peace and economic prosperity.  
4.3  Darfur Regional Government
Fol lowing  the  model  of  the  Kurd ish  Regiona l 
Government in Iraq, Darfur’s Regional Government 
(DRG) could become one entity again, then be organized 
administratively with provinces and sub-units. Its regional 
government would have its own elected governor, a 
national assembly, a cabinet, and a judiciary, as well.  
4.4  The Sudan Federation 
Another administrative option is a federal system similar 
to many countries around the world, such as the US, 
India, Pakistan, and Brazil, in which a federal government 
exercises foreign and defense policies, national legislative 
and judicial policies, and has state governments with 
their own elected governors, national assemblies, and 
administrative structures. Perhaps, this framework suits the 
Sudan best, given its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature.
CONCLUSION
China’s  ro le  in  the  Darfur  Cr is i s  ranged f rom 
obstructionism to cautious involvement, and then to a 
proactive role in which China supported the deployment 
of the UN-African Union peace keepers and contributed 
to it. China played an essential role in convincing 
Sudan’s authoritarian regime to allow force, risking 
international military intervention. From 2007 to the end 
of the summer of 2008, China’s active role successfully 
undermined the international campaign initiated by 
human rights organizations to boycott the Olympic 
Games in Beijing. Although the campaign did not 
generate sufficient momentum to boycott the games, it 
succeeded in pressuring China to intervene in the Darfur 
Crisis. Accordingly, China appointed a Special Envoy to 
deal with the crisis, and its leadership was involved in 
resolving the conflict at the highest levels. China provided 
some humanitarian assistance to Darfur and supported 
the UN’s peace mission as well as the peace process 
efforts shepherd in Qatar. However, China continues its 
arms sales to the Sudan, undeterred by UN resolutions 
that restrict sales and use of arms in the Darfur region. 
In post-2008 Summer Olympic Games, China’s role in 
managing the conflict declined, albeit it continues to 
support the Qatari efforts to resolve it.  
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